A FORMER head of the SAS  has told an inquest that the emergency response to three heat stricken selection candidates on the fatal Brecon Beacons test march was too slow.

Identified as EE, the officer - a major-general and the highest ranking soldier to give evidence - also conceded to problems in preparing and monitoring candidates on the march.

In evidence, EE said the decentralised nature of the SAS may have contributed to the failings and also pointed out that much of the focus at the time was on operations in Afghanistan.

Lance Corporals Craig Roberts and Edward Maher and Corporal James Dunsby all suffered fatal heat illness as temperatures soared on the march in July 2013.

The inquest in Solihull, West Midlands, has heard claims the march was not called off despite the heat because a cancellation would have generated too much paperwork. Candidates have given vivid accounts of running out of water, collapsing in the heat and having to be helped by civilians.

EE, a former head of the SAS, said that – the heat aside – conditions in the hills that day were “perfect” with good visibility, access and an apparently very fit group of men taking part.

At the time of the march EE was  “director of specialist military units” a role overseeing operations support.

In evidence, EE said neither he, nor those directly in charge on the day, were aware that the reservist candidates had stopped being given the same level of training before the test as regular soldiers.

“What struck me most forcibly was the fact that those responsible for conducting the exercise that day were not familiar either with the individuals or the preparatory training that the reservist cohort had undertaken.

“They were very familiar with the training undertaken by the regular candidates and they may have made the assumption that those who were sufficiently conditioned under their own training regime would have reflected the training by the reservists which was of course not the case.

"That was the result of a systematic dislocation in the training process," he said.

EE outlined a “heavy degree of decentralisation” in the SAS with highly experienced individuals left to get on with their own duties.

There was a monitoring system, he said, but in 2013 this was dominated by operational concerns.

He accepted that a “tracker” device designed to pick up if any of the march candidates had stopped was not fit for purpose.

The coroner asked EE if it would have been a serious omission had a “dynamic risk assessment” had not been made with soldiers suffering from heat illness.

EE said it would have been difficult for those in charge of the march to spot what things were going wrong with the “full horror” emerging “slowly and catastrophically”.

Addressing concerns over the “do or die” attitude expressed in evidence by march candidates and overseers, EE said candidates were volunteers who – if successful – would undertake “high-intensity” combat operations.

But it did express concern of his own at the management structure seemingly not working.

“Clearly there were further provisions that might have been made,” he said

The inquest continues.