A SOLDIER’S life came down to the click of a mouse on GPS tracking system that, an inquest heard, was “not fit for purpose”.

An officer in charge of an SAS selection march on which three soldiers died, told the inquest that didn’t see L/Cpl Edward Maher had stopped moving for some 45 minutes because he hadn’t “hovered the mouse” over the soldier’s  GPS tracker - monitored on a computer in the exercise command vehicle.

Had he done so, the officer - known as 1A - would have seen detailed information on L/Cpl Maher’s route times and distance travelled.

L/Cpl Maher was one of three reservist soldiers to die from heat illness as a result of the July 2013 march in sweltering conditions on the Brecon Beacons.

 Several more soldiers became seriously ill.

At the inquest in Solihull, coroner Louise Hunt said she found it “difficult to understand” why L/Cpl Maher wasn’t noticed - he was already developing rigor mortis when found.

1A - described as a signals specialist who passed SAS selection in 1997 - said that “at the time” he hadn’t noticed that the tracker wasn't moving.

But he maintained that he had been “properly monitoring” the soldiers’ progress from the computer in the command vehicle.

In addition to 49lbs of kit, each of the soldiers was carrying a GPS tracker which showed their movements, updated every 10 minutes, to the test commanders.

Police investigations found L/Cpl Maher had stopped moving at 2.16pm on the day.

1A said that at 3pm he decided to dismantle one of the route’s five checkpoints because the marchers were making good progress.

In evidence, he said: “I have been thinking about this every day for two years, why it wasn’t picked up and at the time no alarm bells were ringing. I wasn’t looking at that individual tracker with any concern.”

Coroner Hunt said the decision seemed “a bit cursory” made without analysis of where candidates actually were, and what their speed was.

1A said: “I was content that the position was suitable – from a position point of view, not a time point of view, it was.”

In earlier evidence, 1A described the tracking system itself as “not fit for purpose” as it was “fairly old”.

Concerns about the system were, he said, well known.

When concerns for L/Cpl Maher were raised, it took until 4.45pm for a medic to reach him. By then he was “cold to the touch”.

L/Cpl Maher, 31, L/Cpl Craig Roberts, 24, and Cpl James Dunsby, 31, died after suffering hyperthermia during the  march.

In evidence, 1A said that, in his opinion, the soldiers had not been provided with “suitable conditioning” to undertake the week long selection process.

It was, he said, “ inconceivable” that three “determined, motivated, dedicated, focused” soldiers from the same unit, living in the same room, undergoing the same selection process should suffer the same injuries on the same day all around the same time when they were going so well.

Though the three had been assessed as suitable for selection tests, it was, said 1A, his opinion, that the course syllabus for preparation had not provided them with “suitable conditioning”.

Asked by the coroner if the dynamic risk assessment he carried out on the day was adequate, 1A said “there should be more consideration” given to the process.

The inquest heard how a march planned for the following day went ahead - on a shorter route - with more soldiers struck down by heat injury and others taken off the exercise altogether.

 

NO AWARENESS OF HEAT FORECAST

The inquest heard 1A admit that he was unaware of media reports forecasting the “hottest day of the year”.

Confirming that he had not taken training on heat illness for at least six years before the fatal march, 1A faced a series of questions from coroner Hunt.

He said that because operating conditions had been similar for the previous two weeks of operations, he was “content” that his risk assessment met requirement for special forces selection.

Confirming that the risk assessment was the same as that prepared for the "lead regular unit", 1A said march distances and weights to be carried had not changed since 1997 – with the regular SAS unit  providing the direction, syllabus and standards.

But in terms of the heat forecast, 1A admitted that he “certainly wasn’t” tracking predictions of the hottest day of the year.

The coroner read out related temperatures recorded on July 13 - when the march took place - and the previous nine days that showed temperatures rising from 19C (66.2F) on July 4 to a peak of 28.1C (82.6F) on July 13.

1A said that, in relation to the weather, he could not recall any discussions with the lead regular unit about the weather.

Taking questions about the hot conditions, the chain of command during the exercise, and his own knowledge of heat illness, 1A said: "There was no reason to discuss the weather as far as we were concerned.

"I was delivering an activity that was directed to me. So I had a responsibility, absolutely, but I don't think I owned the risk,” he said.

Though he had some pre-deployment training for Iraq and Afghanistan, 1A said he had received no formal training on writing risk assessments and was "still not clear" on the definition of a heat illness.

Having said he had not seen a Ministry of Defence "algorithm" governing military heat illness cases, 1A was asked further questions about his knowledge of weather conditions.

Daily Met Office updates were available in a cookhouse at his training camp, 1A said, and had predicted a temperature of 25C (77F).

But that, he said, had no alarm bells ringing.

The inquest continues